



The Logical Framework Approach: Is this the most appropriate instrument for managing the elimination of the threat posed by landmines and Explosive Remnants of War in South Sudan?

South Sudan is the newest and arguably one of the most underdeveloped countries in the world. It has suffered significant conflict through multiple civil wars spanning over 30 years and as a consequence is heavily contaminated with the Explosive Remnants of War (ERW). This contamination combined with a severe lack of roads and other infrastructure is impeding humanitarian development. The Logical Framework Approach is currently used by the United Nations South Sudan Mine Action programme to manage the effective reduction of impediments to human development caused by landmines and Explosive Remnants of War. This thesis examines whether the Logical Framework Approach is the most appropriate instrument to use or if a different objective oriented framework is warranted.

Lance J Malin MBE

Final assignment for the award of a Master's Degree in International Development and Humanitarian Aid - Proyecto Kalu 2012 – 2013

Submitted 23 November 2013

CONTENTS

Acronyms and abbreviations	4
Acknowledgements	5
Introduction	6
What is Mine Action?	6
South Sudan - The Country	8
History	8
Birth of the Newest Country in the World	9
South Sudan – Geography	11
Aftermath of Conflict	13
The need for Mine Action Intervention	13
Casualties	15
Early progress after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005	17
Current Situation – Mine Action	17
The Logical Framework Approach (LFA) and Concept of Theory of Change	18
LFA Origins	18
What the LFA was intended to be?	21
LFA Potential Weaknesses	22
Why use the LFA?	23
The Concept of a Theory of Change	25
TOC Origins	25
Popularity in using the TOC approach	27
Example TOC developed by British Department for International Development (DFID)	28

Differing views on the LFA and TOC approaches	29
Summary of LFA and TOC Comparison	31
Applying LFA and TOC to South Sudan	32
UNMAS South Sudan Log Frame 2013	36
UNMAS South Sudan draft TOC	38
Conclusion	38

Acronyms and abbreviations

AXO	Abandoned Explosive Ordnance
CCM	Convention on Cluster Munitions
CCW	Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
DFID	UK Department for International Development
DPKO	Department for Peacekeeping Operations
EO	Explosive Ordnance
ERW	Explosive Remnants of War (Which includes Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) and Abandoned Explosive Ordnance (AXO), but not Landmines)
GICHD	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Development
HA	Suspected Hazardous Area
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IMAS	International Mine Action Standards
IPDET	International Program for Development Evaluation Training
LFA	logical Framework Approach (An approach / methodology)
LF	Logical Framework (A document – log frame)
MRE	Mine/ERW Risk Education
NMAA	National Mine Action Authority
NTSG	National Technical standards and Guidelines
SHA	Suspected Hazardous Area
SPLA	Sudan People’s Liberation Army
TOC	Theory of Change
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance

Acknowledgements

This paper represents the final assignment of a 12 months long course of study in **International Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid** with the *Proyecto Kalu Humanitarian Aid Study Centre*, and would not have been possible at all without the encouragement and support of my wife and best friend, Anne, to whom I will always be eternally grateful.

"The secret of getting ahead is getting started" - Mark Twain

My colleagues here in South Sudan, both within the Mine Action cluster and the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), as well as all other implementing partners and stakeholders, were and continue to be a constant source of inspiration and advice. Their support continues to motivate me further to improve the delivery of the assistance that the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) is able to provide to the people of South Sudan.

"Our greatest weakness lies in giving up. The most certain way to succeed is always to try just one more time" - Thomas A. Edison

Introduction

Over the last few decades there has been an on-going debate in the international development community about the best way to describe how programmes lead to results. One approach that has been largely used is the Logical Framework Approach (LRA). Another increasingly popular approach is the concept of Theory of Change¹. Both tools are used for project planning and to monitor program outcomes. The Logical Framework Approach is currently the required management tool used by the United Nations.

In this thesis, the case study of the United Nations Mine Action Program in South Sudan is used to examine the Logical Framework Approach (LFA) compared with concept of Theory of Change (TOC). The question posed is, does one tool have an advantage over the other in regard to evaluating the needs of the country and moving from a situation of contamination² to one free from the threat of landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW). To better understand the context to which the approaches are applied a description of "What is Mine Action?" and information about the current situation in South Sudan is presented.

What is Mine Action?

Mine Action is a field within humanitarian aid and development concerned with activities that aim to reduce the social, economic, and environmental impact of landmines and the Explosive Remnants of War (ERW).

Mine Action deals with the many effects of landmine and ERW contamination on people and societies. It is commonly represented as comprising five complementary groups of activities³:

- Humanitarian demining, i.e. mine and ERW survey, land release, mapping, marking and clearance
- Risk education (RE), i.e. the communication to the public of the risk of ERW and how to act in the presence of ERW

¹ *WWF logical framework Analysis Sep 2005, Review report, International development, Isobel Vogel, Apr 2012, James, Cathy. (2011). Theory of Change Review: A report commissioned by Comic Relief.*

² *Contaminated with landmines, UXO, AXO, ERW and the detritus of armed conflict*

³ *International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), Chapter 04.10 - Glossary of mine action terms, definitions and abbreviations*

- Victim assistance, including rehabilitation and reintegration
- Stockpile destruction
- Advocacy to promote policies and practices that will reduce the threat from landmines and ERW, usually in the context of disarmament and international humanitarian law. The most commonly applied treaties including the 1997 anti-personnel Mine Ban Treaty, the Convention on Cluster Munitions, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

The coordination of Mine Action activities in affected countries is most often conducted by Mine Action Coordination Centres (MACC)⁴ that is managed either by the United Nations (UN) or the government of the host country government. In South Sudan⁵, the management of the Mine Action Coordination Centre is under the direction of the government's National Mine Action Authority (NMAA).

In a broad sense, mine clearance includes surveys, mapping and minefield marking, and the actual clearance of mines from the ground. This range of activities is also sometimes referred to as "demining".

Humanitarian mine clearance aims to clear land so that civilians can return to their homes and their everyday routines without the threat of landmines and unexploded remnants of war (ERW), which include unexploded ordnance (UXO) and abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO). Essentially this means that all the mines and ERW affecting the places where people live and work must be cleared and that their safety in areas that have been cleared is assured. "Clearance"⁶ is a process and once the mines, ERW, UXO, and AXO

⁴ The objective of Mine Action is to reduce the risk caused by landmines and ERW to a level where people can live safely. The term, "living safely" can be further defined as a situation in which economic, social and health development can occur free from the constraints imposed by landmine and ERW contamination and in which the victims' needs can be addressed

⁵ The name has been changed several times in recent years from South Sudan Demining Authority, (established in April 2004, under the name New Sudan Mine Action Authority), to South Sudan Demining Authority, in 2006,) to South Sudan Demining Commission, to South Sudan National Mine Action Authority, by various Presidential decrees. The new name, NMAA, reflects the broader responsibilities over and above solely demining.

⁶ in the context of mine action, the term refers to "tasks or actions to ensure the removal and/or the destruction of all mine and ERW hazards from a specified area to a specified depth" IMAS 4.1 Glossary, 2013

are cleared the areas are verified so that people can use them without fear⁷. The aim of humanitarian demining is to restore peace and security at the community level.

South Sudan - The Country

History

There are many challenges currently facing development initiatives in South Sudan. A historical context is helpful to understand the situation that is present today. From the Nubians to the Ottoman Turks, former empires have all left their mark on this part of Africa. Perhaps one of the most divisive periods for stultifying the pace of development was the Anglo-Egyptian conquest of Sudan at the end of the 19th Century. One outcome of this period was that the colonial structure that followed created a burgeoning middle class in Northern Sudan while Southern Sudan was left undeveloped. This divide was deepened by the introduction of 'Closed District' policies aimed at administering the south as an entirely separate entity. The concept was to intentionally develop the South at a slower pace by restricting trade, infrastructure, and education. Southern Sudan was thus isolated from the north and until Sudan's independence in 1956. It was planned that these southern lands would be assimilated into British East-Africa⁸; however, in the rush to extricate itself from the region Britain did not de-couple north from south. Over half a century later, South Sudan is still markedly less developed than Sudan in the north and its other neighbours^{9,10}.

South Sudan's difficult road to nationhood included two rounds of civil strife spanning 50 years (1955 – 2005), which is the longest war in African history. Independence on 9th July 2011 was experienced with euphoria and high expectations but the nation's separation from Khartoum, Sudan has been a difficult process. Despite a massive influx of international aid¹¹ the nation remains one of the most impoverished and

⁷ *International Mine Action Standards, 2013*

⁸ Young, John. *The Fate of Sudan* (London, 2012.)

⁹ *Government of the Republic of South Sudan Development Plan 2011*

¹⁰ Elbagir, Nima; Karimi, Faith, Elbagir, Nima; Karimi, Faith (9 July 2011). "South Sudanese celebrate the birth of their nation".

¹¹ "South Sudan was declared an independent state on 9th July 2011 and became a recipient of aid in its own right rather than as a region of Sudan. While Sudan ranks as the 13th largest recipient of official development assistance (ODA) between 2000 and 2009 –

least developed in the world. The continued violence and instability in South Sudan is deeply rooted within historical divisions and power struggles among ever-present political protagonists.

In addition, there are devastating development statistics including over 50% of South Sudanese live below the poverty line, the maternal mortality is the highest in the world, and a national life expectancy of only 42 years¹². Challenges for development in South Sudan today are in many ways different from the challenges faced elsewhere on the continent. The UN currently estimates some 73% of South Sudanese adults are illiterate.¹³ The lack of any real infrastructure (roads), civil service, and effective health care systems has left South Sudan with a considerable gap between needs and capabilities¹⁴. These statistics highlight the harsh living conditions faced by the population. In addition, the long history of skirmishes and war has resulted in a country with vast tracks of land contaminated by mines and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW).

Birth of the Newest Country in the World

On 14th July 2011, the United Nations General Assembly admitted the Republic of South Sudan as the 193rd member of the United Nations, welcoming the newly independent country to the community of nations.

South Sudan's independence from the rest of Sudan is the result of the January 2011 referendum held under the terms of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)¹⁵, which ended the decades-long civil war between the North and the South. "At this moment... in this place... the world gathers to say in one voice: *Welcome, South Sudan. Welcome to the community of nations,*" Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said after the Assembly adopted a resolution, by acclamation, to admit Africa's newest country.

60.6% of which has been humanitarian aid – we know surprisingly little about how much of that benefited South Sudan" - GHA website 2013

¹²OCHA, *Humanitarian Achievements in South Sudan* (as of 31 Dec 2012).

¹³OCHA, *2012 Humanitarian Achievements in South Sudan* (as of 31 Dec 2012.)

¹⁴ *ibid*

¹⁵ *The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), also known as the Naivasha Agreement, was a set of agreements culminating in January 2005 that were signed between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Government of Sudan. The CPA was meant to end the Second Sudanese Civil War, develop democratic governance countrywide and share oil revenues. It further set a timetable by which Southern Sudan had a referendum on its independence. The peace process was encouraged by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), as well as IGAD-Partners, a consortium of donor countries*

On 9th January 2005, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed by the leaders of the north and south. It granted partial-autonomy to Southerners and a new Interim Constitution. Under the terms of the peace agreement, the SPLM leader John Garang became the First Vice-President of the Republic of Sudan and President of the Government of South Sudan. Barely three weeks after being sworn into office in July 2005, John Garang died in an aircraft accident¹⁶. Garang was succeeded by Salva Kiir Mayardit, who remains the current President of the Republic of South Sudan.

On 9th January 2011, Southerners voted on whether to become an independent nation or to remain part of greater Sudan. This referendum was provided for by the peace agreement, and Southerners opted to separate from the north by more than 98% of the vote. Six months later, on 9th July, the Republic of South Sudan was born.

¹⁶ In late July 2005, Garang died after the Ugandan presidential Mi-172 helicopter he was flying in crashed. He had been returning from a meeting in Rwakitura with long-time ally President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda. Interestingly, his widow, Rebecca Nyandeng De Mabior promised to continue his work stating "In our culture we say, if you kill the lion, you see what the lioness will do"

South Sudan - Geography




Fig 1 South Sudan and surrounding countries¹⁷

South Sudan, officially the Republic of South Sudan and previously known as Southern Sudan, is a landlocked country in east-central Africa that is part of the United Nations sub region of Eastern Africa. The capital and largest city is Juba, with a population of approximately 250,000 inhabitants. Juba is also where the main United Nations mission offices are located. South Sudan is the 42nd largest country on earth, in terms of land mass, covering 644,329 Km² (248,777 square miles) which is larger than the area covered by France or Spain¹⁸. Ethiopia to the east, Kenya to the southeast, Uganda to the south, the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the southwest, the Central African Republic to the west, and the Republic of Sudan to the north, border South Sudan. South Sudan is divided into 10 states (Figure 2). The states are

¹⁷ CIA World fact book 2013

¹⁸ ISO standard 3166-1

then further divided into 86 counties, and then each county is sub-divided into Payams and these into Bomas¹⁹).



Fig 2 States in South Sudan²⁰

South Sudan has a population of between 8.2 – 11.8 million²¹ based on available data estimates. A comprehensive UN monitored census is scheduled to be carried out by the government in 2014 (the census is to be completed prior to the Presidential election scheduled for 2015). The majority of the population lives in rural areas and their lives are based on a subsistence economy. Less than 4.5% of available arable land is under cultivation. This region has been negatively affected by war for all but 10 of the years since 1955. This has resulted in neglect and a severe lack of infrastructure development. The country has experienced major destruction and population displacement. As a result of the civil wars, more than 2 million people have died and more than 4 million were (and some still are) internally displaced persons or became refugees.²².

¹⁹ South Sudan Bureau of statistics, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting 2013

²⁰ OCHA 2013

²¹ OCHA south Sudan estimates 2013

²² OCHA estimates 2013

Aftermath of Conflict

The need for Mine Action Intervention

Following civil wars that spanned over 50 year time period and 6-year Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) implementation period, the Republic of South Sudan became the world's newest country on 9th July 2011. Landmines were used throughout the long-running conflict by all parties to defend their positions and to disrupt the movement and operations of enemies. Their pervasive use has meant that many years after the peace agreement was signed, mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) continue to impact communities. Each year, in South Sudan people are maimed and killed in accidents, communities are prevented from receiving humanitarian aid and development, and reconstruction is stalled due to the threat of landmines. The socio-economic cost of landmines and ERW in terms of inhibition of agricultural production, food security, economic activities, and freedom of movement, is incalculable.

UNMAS works to ensure an effective and coordinated UN response to landmines and ERW through collaboration with all interested actors. Over 1,120 sq. km of land have been cleared or verified as being free of landmines and ERW, enabling the development of agricultural land, construction of schools, health clinics, way stations and an educational centre for the blind, among others. Freedom of movement has been restored in many areas, to facilitate the safe return of refugees and IDPs, and aid the efficient and effective distribution of emergency relief. Route survey and clearance teams have, to date, opened over 22,842 km of roads.²³

One example of how clearing landmines can assist with overall development goals and delivering humanitarian aid is through the experience of the World Food Program (WFP). The World Food Program (WFP) delivered 123,277 metric tonnes of food by air in South Sudan between 2002 and 2010 delivered. Air transport, although very expensive, had to be used as the roads were not cleared of landmines and it was

²³ *ibid*

too dangerous to send by truck. The cost of the air transport of food and other humanitarian aid delivery during this time period was over US\$75 Million. The expense of flying in humanitarian aid was prohibitive and not sustainable.

The World Food Program sought additional funding to establish a demining capability, to clear roads and tracks that were necessary to deliver aid. This clearance, implemented by Swiss demining NGO, FSD (Fondation Suisse de Déminage), demined and made safe the main supply routes from neighbouring countries. From 2006 – 2010, WFP delivered 355,062 metric tonnes of food at a total cost of US\$149,463,174. The cost of delivery had reduced from approximately US\$700 per tonne by air to under US\$300 by road. The savings were significant²⁴ and the cost continued to reduce as more trucks became available. The reduction in cost happened because the roads were cleared of landmines.

While much progress has been made reducing the threat and impact of landmines and ERW by UNMAS and its implementing partners, 642 known Hazardous Areas (HAs), of varying size still remain. New suspected hazardous areas are being identified by survey teams on a weekly basis²⁵. The discovery of new threats makes it challenging to estimate the timeline for addressing all high and medium priorities in South Sudan.

²⁴ MOTAPM presentation by author at Fourth Review Conference, High Contracting Parties, November 2011, Geneva

²⁵ IMAS Monthly report September 2013

Casualties

The reported²⁶ numbers of landmine and ERW casualties in South Sudan as of the end of October 2013, totals 4,755 (1,320 killed, 3,435 injured), in 3,341 different accidents. This actual number is likely to be much higher, however, due to under-reporting in a context of a limited communications infrastructure and few health facilities where victims can be assisted and identified. The total casualty figure increases each month as new accidents occur. This situation has been compounded by the laying of new landmines by various militia groups in 2011 - 2012 in the northern states of Unity and Upper Nile, and Jonglei state in 2013.

Another activity conducted by Mine Action teams is Mine Risk Education (MRE). MRE continues to target at-risk populations such as internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees/returnees. Landmine and ERW victims' needs assessments indicate the numbers of people to target. The needs assessment also describes the actual needs of the landmine and ERW victims including job training and psychosocial support. UNMAS evaluates this information and plans an appropriate response to the difficulties faced by victims in South Sudan including physical rehabilitation, economic reintegration, and commitments to such international human rights legislation as the "UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. The socio-economic reintegration projects should be designed to enhance living standards of landmine and ERW survivors and their families and allow them to live in a dignified manner. To date, over 3,185 landmine survivors and persons with disabilities have received victim assistance interventions, approximately 1,800 of which were supported with assistive devices (including prostheses, crutches, wheelchairs, tricycles, and white canes)²⁷.

²⁶ Based on UNMAS Monthly Report dated October 2013

²⁷ *ibid*



Fig 3 Known hazards from Mines/ERW in South Sudan




Fig 4 distribution and numbers of casualties caused by mines/ERW in South Sudan

Early progress after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005

At the time of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005, humanitarian needs in Southern Sudan were massive. More than 90% of the population of South Sudan lived on less than US\$1 a day, despite the GDP per capita of the entirety of Sudan, at that time, being US\$1200 (US\$3.29/day). Humanitarian organizations, through the leadership of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) managing to ensure sufficient funding, was able to bring relief to the local populations.

Related to Mine Action, the South Sudan Demining Authority (SSDA) was established in 2006 by presidential decree to act as the main governmental authority for the coordination, formulation, and supervision of the implementation of plans for removing mines from roads, paths and other places where mines are suspected to be laid or buried. Since 2006, the SDAA changed names several times but the core function has essentially remained the same as when it was established. Today, it is known as the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) headquartered in the National capital, Juba.

While the mine action functions were officially under the direction of the local government since 2005, in practice the UN body responsible for Mine Action²⁸. The UN Mine Action program continues to manage most of the key mine action planning and coordination functions, including the accreditation of mine action organizations, the development of national mine action standards, the establishment of a quality management system, and the management of the national database.

Current Situation - Mine Action

Challenges to clear landmines in South Sudan since it became a separate country have hampered the progress of the clearance. Challenges include continued insecurity and violence - including in areas where

²⁸ Initially the United Nations Mine Action Office (UNMAO), which covered Sudan (Sudan and Southern Sudan), was superseded by the United Nations Mine Action Coordination Centre (UNMACC), which in turn became the United Nations Mine Action service (UNMAS) after the independence of South Sudan in July 2011.

elections were disputed, and in the northern Border States - have resulted in new mines being emplaced²⁹. Extremely harsh weather conditions and terrain also continue to impede progress, for example, extensive flooding above normal seasonal patterns reduced Mine Action's ability to clear major routes of mines that are used for the distribution of humanitarian aid. As of 2012, there were approximately 660 known areas containing explosive threats.³⁰ As previously unknown hazards are continually being discovered it is expected that the overall number of contaminated and cleared areas will both increase.^{31,32}

The Logical Framework Approach (LFA) and Concept of Theory of Change

LFA Origins

The Logical Framework Approach (LFA) is a management tool primarily used in the design, and monitoring and evaluation, of international development projects. The Logical Framework Approach was developed in 1969 for the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). In the 1990s, humanitarian aid organizations often required that a logical framework be included in project proposals, however, in recent years the inclusion of a logical framework in proposals is often optional. An overview of the LFA process is presented below.

The LFA is a **process**, the results of which can be illustrated using a **logical framework matrix**³³ or "**Log Frame**". Since the logical framework approach begins with planning sessions involving stakeholders and partners, it should be about people's priorities. Furthermore, it allows information to be analysed and organized in a structured way and thus functions as an aid to thinking. Preparation of a log frame with the participation of all stakeholders helps to build a project in which all involved can agree to share the same

²⁹ OCHA monthly report Mar 2012

³⁰ UNMAS, IMSMA Report South Sudan, 2013.

³¹ UNMAS, South Sudan 2013

³² Republic of South Sudan, "South Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2012–2016.

³³ WWF logical Framework Analysis Sept 2005

ideas on where the project is going and why the activities are necessary. Log frames can provide an easily accessible answer to the question: "**Why are we doing the things we are doing**"?³⁴

The use of the LRA is described by DFID as being ".....about applying clear, logical thought when seeking to tackle the complex and ever changing challenges of poverty and need...."³⁵ In 2004, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) published a comprehensive summary³⁶ of 'The theory behind the LFA' which made the observation that:

"An objective-oriented project planning process, such as LFA, is made in nine different steps":

- Analysis of the project's Context
- Stakeholder Analysis
- Problem Analysis/Situation analysis
- Objectives Analysis
- Plan of Activities
- Resource Planning
- Indicators/Measurements of Objectives
- Risk Analysis and Risk Management
- Analysis of the Assumptions

³⁴ *ibid*

³⁵ DFID "How To' practice paper January 2011

³⁶ *ibid*

An example of a log frame format is illustrated below, with examples of some of the different terms used to mean the same, by different organisations³⁷.

	Intervention Logic	Objectively measurable and verifiable indicators	Sources of Verification	Important Assumptions
Vision/Goal/Impact	<i>The shared vision to which the project will contribute</i>	<i>The extend of the contribution towards success</i>	<i>How to measure the contribution</i>	
Project Objective/Purpose/Outcome	<i>What is intended to be changed as a result of the intervention</i>	<i>How to know the intended change has occurred (and is sustainable)</i>	<i>How to measure the change (The basis for evaluation)</i>	<i>External factors that need to be in place if the project is to contribute to the overall objective/impact</i>
Results/Outputs	<i>Tangible results of each activity intended to bring about change</i>	<i>How to know that the expected results of the project have been achieved</i>	<i>How to measure results (the basis of periodic review)</i>	<i>External factors that may affect whether a specific objective/outcome is achieved</i>
Activities/Processes	<i>Groups of tasks needed to achieve each expected result</i>	<i>The means, inputs and resources needed to carry out each task</i>	<i>Proof that each activity/task has been completed (What needs to be regularly monitored)</i>	<i>External factors that may affect activities achieving the expected results/outputs and preconditions that need to be fulfilled before the project can start</i>
Inputs/Resources (Usually funding)				

Fig 5 Illustration of a log frame matrix

³⁷ SIDA 2004, Theory behind the LFA

What the LFA was intended to be?

The LFA is intended to enable the main elements of a project to be concisely summarised and to bring structure and logic to the relationship between project purpose and intended inputs, planned activities, and expected results. If the LFA is used as intended, which includes with flexibility, the approach to planning will encourage creative thinking and promote participatory engagement between all parties throughout the project lifecycle.

The LFA was intended to be³⁸:

- An instrument for logical analysis and structured thinking in project planning.
- A framework, a series of questions which, if they are used in a uniform way, provide a structure for the dialogue between different stakeholders in a project.
- A planning instrument, which encompasses the different elements in a process of change (problems, objectives, stakeholders, plan for implementation, etc.). The project plan may then be summarised in a LFA matrix, termed “the log frame”.
- An instrument to create participation/accountability/ownership.
- Common sense.

The LFA is not a control mechanism and does not replace systems such as financial controls, environmental impact assessments, or gender analysis. LFA is intended to be used during all phases of a project cycle, including during preparation, implementation and evaluation. When the analysis has been completed the plans made with the aid of the analysis should then be used and followed-up actively at each project meeting. Due to the dynamic nature of development projects it is often necessary to make adjustments throughout project implementation. The LFA method is intended to be used with flexibility and must be used contextually as circumstances change and the project evolves. A fundamental concept often

³⁸ SIDA – a summary of the theory behind the FLA Jan 2004

overlooked initially by those using the LFA is that the starting point for discussions should be about the problem that needs to be solved and what needs to be achieved (objectives), and not about the activities that are feasible or that can be undertaken by the organisation.

LFA Potential Weaknesses

The logical framework approach can provide an excellent tool for project design, but it also has a number of potential weaknesses³⁹:

- LFA rarely produces good results if it has not been preceded by a thorough situation analysis in the field, including stakeholder analysis. While it has the potential to involve participants, LFA can easily set up an impractical or unrealistic problem / objective framework, depending on the representativeness (or not) of the participants. ***Not all stakeholders were involved in the consultation and the role of female heads of households was underestimated. Village Elders tend to be the most representative spokespersons available, but do not necessarily represent all interests equally. Women and children's interests were not weighted appropriately, at times. More female participation in stakeholder meetings would be advantageous.***
- It may be difficult to get consensus on what should be the project priorities. ***Due to competing economic interests between villages and different tribes within States, objective information on the needs of a particular community can be distorted by those participants that hold power and are most vocal. Government departments are also in competition and with a lack of government funding due to austerity measures, as a result of the total shut down of oil exports from South Sudan, objective planning information is at a premium.***
- Problem analysis can be difficult in cultures where it is inappropriate to discuss problems. ***Spokespersons are culturally hampered from expressing needs and either exaggerate the requirements or do not articulate them accurately.***

³⁹ WWF logical framework analysis Sep 2005

- The logical framework structure is based on a linear view of change, whereas change in the real world is complex, often involving different interacting parallel processes, as well as iterative and cyclic processes. ***This can be a common challenge in any area of development, not just Mine Action in South Sudan.***
- LFA is very time-consuming, and requires a substantial commitment from the project team, stakeholders and project partners. ***With the complexities of South Sudan, from a security and logistical perspective, getting the appropriate stakeholders together, in a timely manner is a major challenge.***
- There is a danger that the process of developing a log frame together with stakeholders can raise unrealistic expectations beyond what the project can actually deliver. In addition, because of the thoroughness of the problem analysis, the LFA approach can lead to idealistic over-planning if the project design team leader or facilitator does not sufficiently emphasize realism and likely budgetary limits. This is one of the greatest dangers of the log frame approach. ***Communities see the UN as having access to unlimited resources and often refuse to accept that some development projects are unrealistic and not achievable.***

Why use the LFA?

In many programmes, LFA is used because it is required by the donor or program implementers, but it is also widely used by a wide variety of government and non-government organisations because if it is used correctly, it can offer a reasonable framework for planning. The use of the LFA approach is required by the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), as the main donor for the Country Mine Action Program

The LFA offers an analytical approach to project planning which enables coordinators to⁴⁰:

- Bring together and present all the key components of a project in a clear, concise, coherent and systematic way.
- Ensure there is no confusion between the various components of a project, so that Activities are not confused with Results and results are not confused with Objectives.
- Easily check the logic of a project and identify inconsistencies and omissions.

⁴⁰ *The Logical framework Approach, Greta Bond, Feb 2013*

- Provide a consistent context for measuring achievements against indicators.
- Review project progress and make any adjustments.
- Maintain accountability and transparency between all parties involved throughout the project life-cycle.

The LFA offers a summary of the key factors of the project for staff, donors, beneficiaries and other stakeholders, which can be referred to throughout the lifecycle of the project. It is not the only planning tool, and should not be an end in itself. The log frame process should also provide a helpful guide to the information that needs to be gathered using participatory methods, and the outcomes of a variety of planning tools.

While the LFA has the potential to be a useful instrument in project planning and implementation, some project managers are not great advocates of the LFA because they feel the complexity of the development projects cannot be expressed in a single piece of paper⁴¹. The LFA language can be intimidating, the process time-consuming, and the structure inflexible. In addition, in some organisations the development of log frames has not been participatory and leads to criticism of the LFA as a 'top-down' planning tool.

Some things to consider for practical applications are that⁴²:

- The log frame isn't intended to show every detail of a project, or to limit the scope.
- Whilst the process may be time-consuming initially, a log frame can save time at all other stages of the project cycle.
- If a 'bottom-up' approach is used the LFA is a tool that lends itself to flexibility, transparency and the building of responsive and a responsible relationship between all participants in a process where every participant has an opportunity to play an equal part. An in-depth knowledge of planning practice is the key to success of this method.

⁴¹ *The Logical Framework approach – Greta Jensen Feb 2013*

⁴² *ibid*

- The log frame can be changed to reflect changes in the intervention environment, in consultation with everyone involved.

The Concept of a Theory of Change

TOC Origins

Theory of Change (TOC) developed out of the desire to evaluate complex social or community change programs when it was not precisely clear what the programmes had set out to do or how to do it, and therefore, difficult to evaluate whether or how they had achieved it⁴³. TOC development can be traced to the late 1950s, with Kirkpatrick's "Four Levels of Learning Evaluation Model"⁴⁴. Further progress and evolution of a TOC approach included Stufflebeam's CIPP⁴⁵ (context, input, processes and products). This included the incorporation and modification of many of the concepts that were already being used in the LFA and being evidenced using log frames, which set out causal chains usually consisting of inputs, activities, outputs and outcomes coupled to long-term goals⁴⁶. Methods such as the LFA had already made significant advances in providing frameworks through which the relationships between a programme's components could be drawn out and articulated.

One of the organizations that began focusing on the challenges of evaluating complex community change was the U.S. based educational and policy studies organization, the Aspen Institute. The Aspen Institute created the Roundtable on Community Change that produced the 1995 publication, "New Approaches to Evaluating Comprehensive Community Initiatives"⁴⁷. In this book, Carol Weiss, a member of the Roundtable's Steering Committee on Evaluation, hypothesized a key reason that complex programmes are so difficult to evaluate is that the assumptions that inspire them are poorly articulated⁴⁸. She argued that

⁴³ Carol Weiss, *Nothing as practical as Good theory*, 1995

⁴⁴ Donald Kirkpatrick - *Evaluating Training Programs*, 1959

⁴⁵ *Education, Evaluation and Decision making*, Daniel Stufflebeam, 1977

⁴⁶ Weiss, Carol 1995, *Nothing as Practical as Good theory*

⁴⁷ *New approaches to Community initiatives*, The Aspen Institute, James I? Connell, Anne C. Kubisch, Lisbeth B. Schorr, Carol H. Weiss

⁴⁸ *ibid*

stakeholders of complex community initiatives typically are unclear about how the change process will unfold and therefore give little attention to the early and mid-term changes that need to happen in order for a longer-term goal to be reached. The lack of clarity about the “mini-steps” that must be taken to reach a long-term outcome not only makes the task of evaluating a complex initiative challenging, but reduces the likelihood that all of the important factors related to the long-term goal will be addressed⁴⁹

Weiss popularized the term “Theory of Change” as a way to describe the set of assumptions that explain both the mini-steps that lead to the long-term goal and the connections between program activities and outcomes that occur at each step of the way. She challenged designers of complex community-based initiatives to be specific about the theories of change guiding their work and suggested that doing so would improve their overall evaluation plans and would strengthen their ability to claim credit for outcomes that were predicted in their theory. She called for the use of an approach that at first sight seems like common sense: “.....*lay out the sequence of outcomes that are expected to occur as the result of an intervention, and plan an evaluation strategy around tracking whether these expected outcomes are actually produced....*”.

Since the publication of Weiss’ book, the use of planning and evaluation using theories of change has increased exponentially among charities, government agencies, international NGOs, the UN, and many other major organizations in both developed and developing countries. This has led to new areas of work, such as linking the theory of change approach to systems thinking and complexity. Change processes are no longer seen as linear but as having many feedback loops that need to be understood. Theories of Change are strengthening monitoring, evaluation, and learning, and also helping to understand and assess impact in hard to measure areas, such as governance, capacity strengthening and institutional development.

⁴⁹ *ibid*

Despite the increased use of the Theory of Change concept, understanding the approach and the methods necessary to implement it effectively are not well understood or uniform⁵⁰. This lack of understanding is evident in the development field and there is evidence of confusion about what the term, Theory of Change, actually means. In some cases what some programme developers describe as Theories of Change' are in essence simply log frames or other approaches that do not encompass the complexity of the concept of Theory of Change⁵¹.

Popularity in using the TOC approach

As part of the DFID commissioned review⁵² involving 40 interviews with staff from 25 development organisations, interviewees gave a number of reasons and expected benefits behind their current interest in Theory of Change as an approach, including:

- Understanding the context and situation as a starting point for planning programmes, bringing critical thinking to bear on the assumptions around a programme, to make the views on how the programme is expected to work transparent.
- To help move beyond 'business as usual', generic programme designs through a greater awareness of the context.
- Developing a common understand of the work and surfacing differences in perspective in a positive way.
- Strengthening the clarity, effectiveness and focus of programmes.
- More flexible alternative to working with log-frames for complex programmes and contexts.
- Using theory of change as a framework from which to assess impact and improve monitoring and evaluation, to test the assumptions, demonstrate impact and learn from it.
- Improving relationships with partners and stakeholders by identifying opportunities for dialogue and collaboration.
- Providing a unifying framework for strategic decision-making, communicating and reporting.

⁵⁰ *Review of theory of Change in international Development, Isobel Vogel, Apr 2012*

⁵¹ *ibid*

⁵² *ibid*

- Wanting to have a clearer conceptualisation of 'impact' and understanding the intermediate changes that have significance for programmes and stakeholders, to enable strategies to be optimised for the context.
- Strengthening adaptive management, responsiveness to changes in the context.
- Looking to find new ways of bringing rigour to the evaluation of complex and emergent change in difficult areas like governance.

Example TOC developed by British Department for International Development (DFID)

During the past five years the use of a TOC approach has moved into mainstream development⁵³. A recent report⁵⁴ commissioned by DFID and published in April 2012, looked at how the TOC was being used in order to learn from this growing practice. DFID themselves have been using this tool in their own internal programming since 2010.

Figure 6 is a TOC developed by DFID for their general mine action activities worldwide. In South Sudan, DFID provides funding for mine action directly to NGOs but does not contract through the UN.

⁵³ *ibid*

⁵⁴ *ibid*




Fig 6 UK DFID TOC for Mine Action

Differing views on the LFA and TOC approaches

During a review⁵⁵ of users of the TOC and LFA approaches in International Development, a number of differing views were expressed by interviewees:

- A good log frame process develops a very robust theory of change which is captured in the interplay between the goal/purpose/output/activity statements and the risks/assumptions
- Every development intervention has a theory of change embedded in it
- A theory of change helps explain the leap from outputs to impact in log frames

⁵⁵ Review of the use of Theory of Change in international Development, Isobel Vogel, April 2012

- For most projects, there is a real struggle with the leaps of logic in the middle of the framework. Impact is easy e.g. health, wealth & happiness; Activities are easy as we know what we want to do. However, the difficulty is getting from Activities to Impact in only four steps. TOCs really help to force projects to explain the Output to Impact logic, as this is rather hard if you only have one logic step to span this yawning gap
- It is a struggle with the leap between outputs and outcomes. It was recognised that while log frames were good for building dams or sending people to the moon they were much less good for research or development projects.
- One of the basic challenges with a TOC is finding a good ways of representing them, which are both simple enough but not too simple
- A Log Frame is one of a number of ways of representing a project's TOC. It is not the only way, and has problems as well as merits.
- Many of the intricacies behind log frames have got lost and they are not being used as originally intended
- There's been a huge collective memory loss about log frames, which are now just accounting templates rather than stakeholder engagement tools (which is how we used to use them)
- There is often a trade-off between the explanatory and persuasive aspects of the underlying logic behind a Theory of Change and log frame
- Theories of change (and tools that employ them) serve two purposes:
 - to model a situation to better understand it and programme around it
 - to simplify a complex situation to help explain it to others and persuade them of the logic of your proposed intervention (e.g. for funding) and in practice there is often a trade-off between the explanatory and persuasive aspects of the underlying logic
- At the moment the Theory of Change is so unfamiliar to people that they have to wrestle with the idea and it forces them to think about their programme. This has a limited window of opportunity, and may, over time, evolve into just another exercise to get the funds released. As people become familiar with the ideas behind the TOC and experts start offering consultancy to develop the TOC for programmes, the key idea behind

them which is to get people to think more thoroughly, may become as lost as it has with the Logical Framework

- How can we facilitate the robust thinking and analysis, and move past the 'tick-box template' effect, whether for log-frames or theory of change?

Summary of LFA and TOC Comparison

Although there is much debate, there is no agreed upon definition of a Theory of Change or how it differs from a Logical Framework. The discussions continue regarding the most appropriate use of each tool and the underlying reasons for using one approach in favour of another.

Both of the approaches have the same general purpose which is to describe how a programme will lead to results and to assist in critical thinking about this process. Some have argued that a Theory of Change is essentially the same thing as a Logical Framework; it is just that over time people have forgotten how to do logical frameworks properly⁵⁶.

In practice, however, there are some basic differences in how the LFA and TOC are used. The TOC can provide a global view of a project and all the components that are likely to impact implementation including the possible pathways leading to change and why they would lead to change. The LFA can be seen by some as zooming in on a specific pathway the programme deals with and creating a neat and orderly structure for it. The neat and orderly structure of LFA also makes it easier to monitor program implementation.

As the debate continues as to move from the LFA or TOC, some transition is evident. DFID is using TOC for internal planning and soon may require funding recipients to use it as well. Some parts of the UN still require the use of the LFA but other organisation's funding proposals now have LFA inclusion as an option and not mandatory.

⁵⁶ Louise Shaxson, *Knowledge Brokers' Forum – Log frames vs. Theory of Change*

Applying LFA and TOC to South Sudan

In this section, the Log Frame Approach and concept of Theory of Change are applied to the real-world setting of the United Nations Mine Action Services (UNMAS) Programme in South Sudan. The UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) currently requires the use of a Log frame (this log frame is intended to be the result of detailed analysis using the Logical Framework Approach).

UNMAS is a relatively new organisation within the UN family, having been created in 1997 to serve as the UN focal point for Mine action and to support the UN's vision of *"a world free of the threat of landmines and unexploded ordnance, where individuals and communities live in a safe environment conducive to development and where mine survivors are fully integrated into their societies."*⁵⁷ Appropriate training for all staff is a key aspect of UNMAS' work in order to deliver the best results possible with the resources available. As such, all Programme Managers are required to undertake training courses many of which have been tailored to Mine Action under the "International Program for Development Evaluation Training" (IPDET). Part of this training included exposure to the Theory of Change (TOC) approach to programme planning.

UNMAS currently uses the UNMISS model when determining specific priorities for Mine Action intervention and for articulating these priorities at a high level using a specific log frame. For this reason, there is more documentation for this case study available for the Log Frame Approach compared to the Theory of Change. The existing log frame, prepared as a requirement of the donor, UNMISS which is currently used by the Mine Action Programme, is included in this section (Figure 7). A sample TOC (Figure 8) was created for the Mine Action Programme for comparative purposes. The similarities of the two approaches are that both do link actions to outcomes. The content in the Figures are similar, but the difference is that the TOC includes more background theory of why things will change and focuses more on mid-range goals.

⁵⁷ *United Nations handbook 2023 - 2014*

Mine Action is not solely about removing mines and ERW from the ground, which is a relatively straightforward technical task, similar to constructing a building, where resources are provided to fuel activities resulting in the construction of a structure. Similarly, once contaminated areas are located, resources are used to fuel the mine and ERW removal tasks which result in cleared land. Both processes have built in safety and security mechanisms and Quality Management systems to ensure that the final product meets the required standards which were specified in a contract or by applicable laws. Mine Action is regulated by International Mine Action Standards (IMAS⁵⁸) from which countries develop their own National Mine Action Standards (NMAS) and these are then the basis for individual implementing partner's Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). The standards, however, are concerned with "How the job is done", not "Why the job is done".

In many areas of international humanitarian intervention including natural or man-made disaster, Mine Action is initially a necessary component in the emergency phase. After a certain period of time which varies on a case by case basis, this emergency phase evolves into a developmental phase as normality returns to communities and basic needs for survival give way to a need for a more sustainable future.

The situation in South Sudan is no different and planning for a sustainable development phase in coordination with the UN Agencies, the host government, international and local NGOs, and the host communities, is challenging in such a complex and rapidly changing physical and political environment. After over 50 years of civil unrest there was a democratic change to Independence as a country, followed in less than six months by the shutting down of oil exports, which represented 98% of annual national income. The situation in South Sudan was further exacerbated by the global economic downturn which threatened potential funding from foreign aid sources. This case was unprecedented in global history and the UN prepared itself for another national disaster of monumental proportions.

⁵⁸ <http://www.mineactionstandards.org/international-standards/imas-in-english/list-of-imas/>

Throughout this time period, the need to open and keep open arterial roads from neighbouring countries by removing the threat of mines and ERW was very important. Priorities were evident and easily agreed upon with stakeholders, including the need to clear land to be used by IDPs, Returnees and Refugees. The areas to be cleared by mine action teams were scheduled in a well-coordinated manner. The LFA was being used to articulate plans which were then funded and implemented. Sufficient flexibility was built into the log frame to enable the plan to be adapted as circumstances changed. Unfortunately, the stakeholder involvement in the LFA process was not as comprehensive as hoped because some decision making staff did not make themselves available for meetings, therefore, decisions had to be taken by those present based on the collective best interests and intentions of the majority. Likewise, involvement of community representatives was equally hampered due to logistical constraints and vested interests amongst local government officials in convening community meetings. Despite these shortfalls in the development of the LFA (See Figure 7, below), a solution acceptable to the majority of representatives present during the process was derived from the meetings and focus groups.

An attempt was made in 2013 to carry out a similar set of activities using the TOC approach, but due to similar logistical and security constraints as there were when creating the LFA, it was a much reduced level of participation than desired. Figure 8 is the result of the newly created TOC log frame. Neither the LFA nor TOC processes were implemented to the breadth-or-depth of what would have been an all-inclusive and exhaustive process. This is an example of how a real-world situation, with logistical and time constraints can impede the full development of any type of log frame.

From a purely visual perspective of the final products (the log frame of the LFA and the TOC), the TOC is somewhat easier to follow and the lines linking different statements do more readily identify that there is interlinking and interdependence on many elements. Similar linkages are evident in the TOC table prepared by DFID (Figure 6). The underlying theory of both the LFA and TOC can be confusing and seem more

complicated than it actually is when applied in practice. Essentially, both approaches share many common elements which should be undertaken but which are, unfortunately, overlooked or ignored as being too complicated or too time consuming.

For both approaches the time and resources needed to undertake the processes effectively are often underestimated and getting the appropriate decision-makers and informed representatives together is a challenge. Getting the 'buy in' from stakeholders who in many cases view these both as administrative hurdles that are there to act as 'tick boxes' for donors, see the TOC approach as yet another new management tool which will be mandatory for a few years and then replaced with something equally new and "revolutionary".

For mine action in South Sudan, both approaches if applied thoroughly, diligently, and in an inclusive manner, offer ways to capture the elements of any potential intervention and demonstrate the logic behind the decisions that must be made. This can then be turned into a plan for a programme. Both approaches capture the assumptions that are made and include mechanisms for monitoring and evaluating the results.

For mine action in south Sudan, it is a requirement of the donor (UNMISS) to use the LFA which is articulated in a log frame. There are elements, of the TOC, however, that offer a more in-depth analysis of a wider-spread of variables and possible outcomes. As such, as Programme Manager of this programme and seeing advantages of both approaches, my intention is to incorporate both approaches in future planning. This will include using the donor mandated LFA (which is what is used for reporting purposes) combined with a more detailed TOC to be used for practical programming. A key factor, from my experience, in the successful implementation of either of these approaches is to ensure that key staff members are properly trained and have relevant experience in using both LFA and TOC.

UNMAS South Sudan Log Frame 2013

Objective	Expected accomplishment	Performance indicator/indicator of achievement	Output/deliverable	Funding Source	Lead (support)	Deadline
1. To reduce the risks to individuals and the socio-economic impacts of mines and ERW are reduced. [UNMAS Strategy Strategic Objective 1]	1.1 Enhanced freedom of movement and access to land for all concerned parties.	20% of accessible surveyed hazardous areas (HAs) currently known in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) released to local communities for productive use by June 2014.	1.1.1. A minimum of 750 kms of roads are released and mapped for use.	AB/VTF	UNMAS SS/IPS	30-Jun-14
			1.1.2. Emergency Landing Helicopter Sites cleared within 72 hours from UNMISS' request.	AB	UNMAS SS/IPS	30-Jun-14
			1.1.2. Known hazards currently in the database reduced by 30 %.	AB/VTF	UNMAS SS/IPS	30-Jun-14
			1.1.3. 5,000,000 sqmt of land released to local communities for productive use.	AB/VTF	UNMAS SS/IPS	30-Jun-14
			1.1.4. Release either Western or Northern Bahr El Ghazal as low threat.	AB/VTF	UNMAS SS/IPS	30-Jun-14
			1.1.5. Bor new temporary sub-office is opened.	AB	UNMAS SS/UNMISS	30-Jun-14
	1.2 Enhanced awareness of Physical Security and Stockpile Management needs in South Sudan.	1.2. A needs assessment study of ammunition storage facilities is conducted throughout South Sudan (10 States).	1.2.1. Report on ammunition management capacity in South Sudan.	AB/VTF	UNMAS SS/IPS	30-Jun-14
	1.3. Enhanced coordination between all mine action partners in South Sudan.	1.3.1. IMSMA NG Database system is fully operational and integrated into the prioritization system	1.3.1.1 Monthly IMSMA reports are produced and distributed to all mine action partners in South Sudan.	AB	UNMAS SS	
			1.3.1.2 New impact monitoring system is in place in the database.	AB	UNMAS SS	
			1.3.2. 0 down days due to late release of tasking dossiers.	AB/VTF	UNMAS SS	
		1.3.2.1. All task dossiers are issued before completion of current tasks to keep continuous work.	AB/VTF	UNMAS SS		

			1.3.2.2. Monthly planning and coordination meetings.	AB/VTF	UNMAS SS	
1.4. Increased Quality Management of Mine Action activities in South Sudan.	1.4. 0 accidents rate for contractors/NGOs. - 90% of Quality Assurance assessments award passing grades to contractors and NGOs.		1.4.1.1. All in country teams accredited and ready to work by 1 October 2013.	AB/VTF	UNMAS SS/IPS	
			1.4.1.2. An average of 1 monitoring and QA visit per organisation each month.	AB/VTF	UNMAS SS	
1.5. Increased awareness amongst the local population of the mine/ERW threat.	1.5.1. KAP Survey demonstrate that 80% of MRE beneficiaries reached by MRE understood and received messages delivered.		1.5.1.1. 200,000 beneficiaries reached by MRE trainings.	AB/VTF	UNMAS SS/IPS	30-Jun-14
			1.5.1.2. 20 MRE teams are accredited.	AB/VTF	UNMAS SS/IPS	30-Jun-14
2. To strengthen the managerial and operational capacity of the GRSS to protect civilians from the threat posed by mines/ERW in compliance with international legislation/treaties [Security Council Resolution 1996 (2011), para. 3. vi.]	2.1 Enhanced capacity of the GRSS to manage MA activities.	2.1. Increase in the transition Index (2013-14: 75% or 37%).	2.1.1. A government prioritization strategy is in place and implemented.	AB/VTF	UNMAS SS/NMAA/GoSS	30-Jun-14
			2.1.2. 20 South Sudanese police EOD trained.	AB	UNMAS/SPSS	30-Jun-14
		2.1. Establishment of a working and manned NMAA sub-office in Wau.	2.1. Completion of Wau sub-office.	AB	UNMAS SS/NMAA	30-Jun-14
2.2 Increased GRSS commitment to respect International Mine Action treaties/conventions.	2.2. Government commitment to ratify CRPD/CCW/CCM through attendance of the Meetings of States Parties to APMBT and CCM.		2.2. Two advocacy meetings are organised with the NMAA and 1 workshop involving the GRSS.	AB/VTF	UNMAS SS/GoSS/NMAA	30-Jun-14

Fig 7 Current UNMAS Log frame for South Sudan

UNMAS South Sudan draft TOC




Fig 8 Draft TOC for Mine action – South Sudan

Conclusion

Over the last few decades there has been an on-going debate in the international development community about the best way to describe how programmes lead to results. One approach has been to use a Logical Framework (also called a Log Frame), which most donors now require. Another increasingly popular approach is to create a Theory of Change.

Something worthy of consideration is making it difficult to choose one tool over the other is the situation that there is no official definition of a Theory of Change or how it differs from a Logical Framework. Both

approaches have the same general purpose which is to describe how a programme will lead to results and to help to critically think about the process and programme. As stated previously in the thesis, some argue that a Theory of Change is essentially the same thing as a Logical Framework but that over time, people have forgotten how to do Logical Frameworks properly.

There is no definitive answer to the question of whether LFA or TOC is better suited for complex humanitarian situations. After conducting the research for this thesis and in reflecting on the experience of the Mine Action Programme in South Sudan, the conclusion of the question posed in this thesis is that both the LFA and TOC approach, if implemented properly, would be useful for this programme. There is not enough of a significant advantage or disadvantage in either one to claim that one is 'better' than another for the purposes of implementing the programme I am managing. However, I do strongly believe that a key factor in the successful implementation of either of these approaches is to ensure that key staff members are appropriately trained and then get relevant experience in both the LFA and TOC approaches. The academic and international development community will continue to evaluate and discuss the issue and further research and analysis; both on a theory level and practically in the field are needed before there is a definitive decision about which one is more appropriate for complex humanitarian programs. .